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ABSTRACT: Pierce’s Disease (PD) is a bacterial disease that can kill grapevines over a 
span of one to three years.  In this paper, we examine and model PD and vector control 
decisions made at the vineyard level in the Napa Valley in an effort to understand how 
the pest and disease affect individual growers, and to examine spatial externality issues 
and potential benefits from cooperation between adjacent vineyards.  The model that we 
created adds to the literature by (a) treating grape vines as capital stocks that take time to 
reach bearing age and thus cannot be immediately replaced in the event of becoming 
diseased.  We also (b) relax the assumption of an interior solution by examining the 
boundaries of parameter space for which winegrape growing is profitable and thus 
allowing growers to abandon land if it is not.  We also explore (c) the effect of changing 
different policy parameters, such as PD control and vine replacement costs.  Finally (d) 
we examine the potential benefits of cooperation between growers to manage vector 
populations, and determine that coordinated vector control could help riparian-adjacent 
growers to lessen grapevine losses and land abandonment, and thus to remain profitable 
in times of high PD pressure. 
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Introduction 
Pierce’s Disease (PD), caused by a strain of the bacterium Xylella fastidiosa (Xf), was 
first reported in California vineyards in the 1880s.  PD can kill grapevines over a span of 
one to three years by clogging the xylem and thus limiting water transport within the 
plant.  Today, PD has been identified in grapevines in 28 California counties (California 
Department of Agriculture 2009).   
In California, PD is spread mainly by sap-feeding insects called sharpshooters.  
The relevant species of sharpshooters and the nature of the problems they impose vary 
significantly among the major winegrape growing regions of California.  In the Napa 
Valley, native Blue-Green Sharpshooters (Graphocephala atropunctata, BGSS) have 
vectored PD from riparian areas (near streams and rivers) into vineyards for many years.  
The problem there is regarded as chronic but manageable, with severity that varies from 
year to year.  However, some growers have chosen to abandon otherwise exceedingly 
valuable land in areas where it is too difficult to control the disease (See Figure 1 for an 
aerial image of abandoned or partially-abandoned blocks).  
In this paper, we examine and model PD and vector control decisions made at the 
vineyard level in the Napa Valley in an effort to understand how the pest and disease 
affect individual growers, and to examine spatial externality issues and potential benefits 
from cooperation between adjacent vineyards.  The model that we created adds to the 
literature by (a) treating grape vines as capital stocks that take time to reach bearing age 
and thus cannot be immediately replaced in the event of becoming diseased.  This builds 
directly upon the work of Brown (1997) and Brown, Lynch, and Zilberman (2002) who 
considered the same disease in the Napa Valley but did not consider the perennial nature 
of grapes.  We also (b) relax the assumption of an interior solution by examining the 3 
 
boundaries of parameter space for which winegrape growing is profitable and thus 
allowing growers to abandon land if it is not.  This issue is of particular interest because 
vineyard land in Napa County is some of the most expensive in the world (on average, 
between $225,000 and 300,000/acre), and thus abandonment represents a large 
opportunity cost (California Chapter of the American Society of Farm Managers and 
Rural Appraisers 2010).   
We also explore (c) the effect of changing different policy parameters, such as PD 
control and vine replacement costs.  These numerical explorations could offer insight to 
policymakers in times of PD stress, or in the event of the introduction of an exotic vector, 
such as the Glassy-Winged Sharpshooter, which has decimated vineyards in southern 
parts of the state.  Finally (d) we examine the potential benefits of cooperation between 
growers to manage vector populations, and determine that coordinated vector control 
could help riparian-adjacent growers to lessen grapevine losses and land abandonment, 
and thus to remain profitable in times of high PD pressure. 
 
Motivation 
The main breeding habitat for BGSSs is in the riparian zone, although irrigated 
landscaped areas can also host breeding populations (Pierce's Disease/Riparian Habitat 
Workgroup 2000).  While some BGSSs will remain in the riparian area throughout their 
lifecycle, some adult female sharpshooters leave in the spring and lay their eggs on lush 
new growth in surrounding vineyards.  Upon hatching, nymphs go through several 
moltings before they become winged adults and can leave the plant on which they 
hatched.  If a BGSS feeds on an infected plant, the bacteria can attach to its mouthparts 4 
 
and colonize there.
1  Prior to the adult stage, the BGSSs shed their mouthparts as part of 
each molting, but if they do become infected at the adult stage, they will remain so until 
their death, and can transmit PD with an efficiency of up to 90 percent upon any given 
feeding (Purcell and Finlay 1979).   
  The flight range for the BGSS is not far; most insects do not travel more than 800 
feet from where they hatch.  Nevertheless, the damage they inflict in riparian-adjacent 
vineyards can be substantial.  In interviews we conducted with growers, many individuals 
stated that in vineyards near riparian corridors, PD caused major economic losses; some 
vineyard managers stated that it was the main reason for abandoning vineyard blocks in 
the most seriously affected locations (Grower A 2009; Grower B 2010).
2  Figure 1 in 
Appendix A shows aerial photos of vineyards with blocks of abandoned land. 
In the Napa Valley, one of the main methods of contending with PD is to remove 
the riparian plants that harbor breeding populations of the BGSS.  One vineyard manager 
interviewed stated that the removal of host plants can reduce PD-related vine loss by up 
to 90 percent (Grower C 2009).  Others did not estimate such high effectiveness, but most 
stated that riparian revegetation could yield substantial economic gains, provided that 
work in the riparian area was not too difficult because of rocky or steep conditions.  Even 
under good working conditions, costs associated with revegetation can be significant.  
The process of design, approval, and implementation of a riparian revegetation plan can 
take over a year to complete (Pierce's Disease/Riparian Habitat Workgroup 2000).  To 
encourage survival of the new plantings, a drip irrigation system must be installed.  Field 
interviewees gave estimates of between $5 (Grower C 2009) and $12 per foot of river 
                                                           
1 Plants that harbor PD are not limited to grapevines. 
 
2 Names are suppressed for confidentiality. 5 
 
frontage (Grower A 2009) and beyond (Grower D 2010) for initial costs of revegetating a 
stretch of river.   
While Napa County produced less than 4 percent of the total volume of the grapes 
crushed for wine in California in 2008, the winegrape crush in that year was valued at 
nearly $400 million, or over 20 percent of the total crush revenue in the state (California 
Department of Agriculture/National Agricultural Statistics Service 2009).  Therefore, 
while it may be less threatening to the California wine grape industry than other vectors 
of PD, such as the newly-arrived invasive Glassy-Winged Sharpshooter that plays a role 
in the southern part of the state, growers and policymakers are very concerned about the 
damages and corresponding economic losses that the BGSS can cause.   
 
Interviews 
To get a better idea of the PD situation in Napa County, we interviewed seven vineyard 
managers during February and March of 2010, using a process called “participatory 
mapping.”  Aiming to glean insight into how PD costs and damages vary among 
properties, we asked respondents to sketch onto aerial images of their vineyard blocks 
where and how they manage PD and the associated costs.  Each interviewee was 
presented with two images; one was for a block adjacent to a riparian area, while the 
other was as similar as possible in grape variety and clone, but relatively far away from 
the riparian zone.  Figure 1 in Appendix A shows an example of an aerial image of 
vineyard blocks adjacent to the Napa River, onto which a vineyard manager has made 
notes regarding PD problems and associated management strategies such as aggressive 
replanting (“aggr. replant”) or partial abandonment (“No replant”).   6 
 
  A recurring theme in the interviews was the presence of spatial externalities. 
Specifically, vineyard managers worried if and how their neighbors were controlling for 
PD and how it might affect them.  In what follows, we attempt to model those 
interactions and to examine how adjacent vineyard managers’ decisions can affect each 
other.   
    
Bioeconomic Model of Spatial Pest and Disease Externalities 
Many published articles have used optimal control techniques to model the management 
of a pest or disease within an agricultural or wildlife setting.  To our knowledge, though, 
none of these studies used optimal control to model pest and disease management for a 
perennial crop.   
  Several articles in particular have guided our thinking about the bioeconomic 
modeling of agricultural pests and diseases.  Fenichel and Horan (2007) addressed bovine 
tuberculosis in deer populations, and showed that sex-based harvesting strategies can be 
an important tool in curbing disease prevalence.  Bicknell, Wilen, and Howitt (1999) also 
examined bovine tuberculosis, but across different populations:  as spread to cattle in 
New Zealand by Australian brushtailed possums.  They showed the importance of the 
disease transmission rate in influencing the sensitivity of cattle farmers to rates of subsidy 
for trapping possums.  Marsh, Huffaker, and Long (2000) addressed potato leafroll virus 
vectored by the green peach aphid, highlighting the influence of weather patterns and 
degree-day accumulation on the aphid population size and therefore its ability to vector 
the virus.  Bhat and Huffaker (2007) used game theory to explore cooperation between 
adjacent landowners who face damages from beavers.  They showed that the potential 7 
 
economic gains from cooperation are substantial, and are maximized in the scenario in 
which the landowners have the greatest flexibility in the extent of their cooperation.  
Additional studies have considered the spatial spread of vectors, specifically for 
PD as vectored by the BGSS in the Napa Valley wine industry, but have not addressed 
the perennial nature of the crop.  Brown, Lynch, and Zilberman (2002) emphasized 
disease transmission and source control for dealing with the problem.
3  The authors 
considered riparian plant removal, but focused mainly on barrier methods.  This pest 
control method reduces the transmission of the disease from the riparian area into the 
vineyard by placing an obstruction between the source habitat and the vineyard.  The 
authors assumed that vineyard managers would grow a barrier of Christmas trees, and 
that these trees could be sold.  They modeled disease prevalence as a function of the 
effectiveness of the barrier in preventing the insects from moving into the vineyard, with 
the spread of the disease determined by the width and effectiveness of the barrier.  The 
authors used these components to create a social decision problem with choice variables 
including (a) the width of the barrier; (b) input use; and (c) the extent of removal of 
source vegetation.   
  Brown (1997) modeled the decision of whether to remove riparian plants in 
greater detail.  At the time of the study, riparian revegetation was not an option because 
of laws governing riparian areas, but Brown examined decisions regarding revegetation if 
it were legalized.  She estimated that costs of removal and revegetation would have to be 
greater than $42 per foot to induce a profit-maximizing grower to choose not to undertake 
                                                           
3 The authors ignored pesticide use because, at the time of the article’s publication, only one pesticide 
(Dimethoate 400) was permitted for riparian application and it required a special permit.  This method of 
pest management is now illegal in Napa County.  Imidacloprid, the current pesticide of choice for 
sharpshooters, was not examined. 8 
 
revegetation.  We build on this work by allowing explicitly for the perennial crop 
characteristics, which mean that loss of vines involves economic losses over multiple 
years.  Considering the perennial nature of the crop may be especially important because 
it implies that grapevines should be treated as a capital stock. 
    
A Basic Model 
In this section we describe a bioeconomic model and the results from applying it to 
examine growers’ decisions about PD control under a variety of scenarios defined in 
terms of the number of growers and the extent of their cooperation.  We have created a 
basic model in which we use optimal control to define parameterized solutions for three 
scenarios: 1) a single isolated grower, 2) two growers, one of whom controls unilaterally, 
taking the neighbor’s insect population (and therefore dispersal) as given, and 3) a social 
planner who maximizes the joint profit of multiple blocks with inter-block sharpshooter 
migration. 
  What follows is a basic model of a pest or disease that spreads over space and 
affects a perennial crop.  We present this model in reference to PD in the Napa Valley, 
although it is applicable to other pests and diseases that affect perennials over multiple 
seasons.  Let Ni  represent the insect population on grower i's land.  Nj  represents the 
insect population on i’s neighbors’ properties, N1, N2,…, Ni-1, Ni+1,…NM.   Ii  represents 
the number of vines bought to replace those killed by disease and natural death, and Yi is 
i's yield per vine that is healthy and has reached bearing age.  
NB
i A and 
B
i A represent the 
numbers of non-bearing and bearing vines, respectively.  The cost functions for control 
and investment are expressed as w
S(Si)
  and w
I(Ii), respectively.  The price per ton of the 9 
 
grapes crushed is represented by p.  i S  is the quantity of individual i’s control.  Each 
grower chooses Si and Ii to solve the following problem over a given time period, where ρ 
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  This maximization problem is subject to several constraints in the form of 
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where R measures sharpshooter intrinsic growth rate, Kis a measure of the carrying 
capacity of the insect population,βmeasures the effectiveness of the control, and  i,j δ ,        
( i,j δ0  ) is the entry from the i
th row and the j
th column of the MxM dispersal matrix, 





i A , also are defined by differential equations.  Each stock has a 
separate equation; since grapevines take between three and five years to reach bearing 
age, it is not possible for growers to buy replacement vines that will bear immediately.
4  
The vines are modeled as capital stocks and the pest causes a loss of capital, a departure 
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4 Pierce’s Disease kills the entire grapevine, including the root system.  Therefore, grafting is not an option 
for vine replacement. 
 
5 Note that the control can also be structured to reduce insect carrying capacity, which would more 
accurately reflect the case of riparian revegetation.  This is easily accomplished by allowing the control to 
change the relationship of R and K.  Results are available in which we conducted analyses in this fashion.  
However, the two sets of results are not substantively different, and the model above allows greater 
generality since it could apply to either pesticide application or riparian revegetation. 10 
 
(4) 
B μ d η
B NB B B
i i i i i A A A N A                              
The parameter d
j, j=NB, B, measures the damage to the non-bearing or bearing stock, 
respectively, that is caused by each insect. The percentage of vines that mature from non-
bearing to bearing each year is represented by μ, and η represents the percentage of vines 
that die of natural causes each year.  Additionally, the total number of vines that grower i 
can have is constrained by the total amount of land in a given block,Ai, which can be 
greater than the sum of all planted acres if the grower chooses to leave some land fallow.  
In (5) ai converts vines to acres (its units are acres/vine).   
(5)   A a ( )
NB B
i i i i AA                              
 
Social Planner Case 
The social planner aims to maximize the sum of profits across all landowners on the 
riparian strip, i=1,…,M.   Because the land constraint does not vary over time, we write 
the problem as a Lagrangian instead of a Hamiltonian (Kamien and Schwartz 1991).  The 
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Assuming an interior solution, the optimal control first-order conditions on the control 
variables, S and I, are given in Equations (7) and (8).
6   At the optimum, the marginal cost 
of vine replacement is equal to the shadow value of a non-bearing vine, and the marginal 
cost of an additional unit of control is equal to the value of the marginal damage, which is 
positive since  i  <0. 
(7)
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  Taking derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to the shadow values gives us 
back the equations of motion.  To allow for land abandonment in the land constraint, we 










If (9) is strictly negative, land is abandoned, and  0
A
i   .  If, instead, 
A
i   > 0, then (9) 
must equal zero, with all land planted in vines (Kamien and Schwartz 1991).  Note that 
the derivative of (5) also implies that when absent abandonment,  
(10) 
B NB
ii AA  ,  
meaning that the change in the stock of bearing vines is equal to the negative of the 
change in the non-bearing vines,  Alternatively, with some abandonment, 
(11)     a
Aband NB B
i i i A A A    ,  
                                                           
6 Chiang (1992) showed that additional state-space equations must be satisfied to check the robustness of 
the solution when there are constraints on the state variables that do not include the control variable.   12 
 
meaning that any change in one of the bearing, nonbearing, or abandoned acreage stocks 
is equal to the negative of the combined change in acreage of the others.   
  The full system of equations is rounded out by the costate conditions, some of 
which we have omitted here to conserve space.   
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j
A A N S       

       
   
The insect population costate equation, (12), is interpreted such that that any change in 
the value of damage caused by sharpshooters is a function of the shadow value of vines 
lost to PD and the current shadow value of insects adjusted for the marginal productivity 
of the insect and discounting, as well as dispersal; growers take into account the insects 
that leave their properties (δii ). 
  For one isolated grower, the sole difference in the model is that the dispersal term 
drops out.  Thus (12) becomes 
(12a)    
R
d +d R 2 ρ,
K
NB NB NB B B B
i i i i i i i i A A N S            
  
and thus the isolated grower takes into account only the damage resulting from the insects 






The ways in which the different growers interact can vary, and a scenario in which a 
social planner benevolently organizes them is extremely rare.  Following Janmaat (2005), 
we explore an alternative situation in which each grower maximizes his own profit 
without regard for the effect on his neighbors.  The optimization results differ from those 
of the social planner in Equation (12).  
  Solving for Ni  and comparing the outcomes from the social planner and non-
cooperative cases in the steady state shows that insect populations will be greater under 
the noncooperative regime compared with the social planner regime; in Equation (13) 
SP
i N  represents the number of BGSSs under the social planner regime, and 
NC
i N









ii  ceteris paribus, or more explicitly: 
(13)      2R R ρ β d d
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Because of both the number of constraints and their nonlinear nature, an analytical 
solution is not feasible, even for a one-grower case in which dispersal is disallowed for 
the purposes of simplification.  Instead, we now present numerical analyses for examples 14 
 
of one-grower and multiple-grower or (multiple-block) cases at their steady states.
7  The 
parameterization of these models is described in Appendix B.  While the choices of 
parameters were informed by interviews with growers and relevant literature, as well as 
discussions with scientists, exact parameter estimates were not readily available in all 
cases and therefore the results presented should be thought of as numerical examples 
rather than empirical case studies.
8   
 
One-Grower Case 
If one vineyard represents the entire universe of our interest, dispersal of insects between 
different landowners need not be considered.  In this case, the grower maximizes 
individual profit subject to the same constraints described above, with the exception of 








  term.   
To determine the importance of the different parameters in the one-grower case, 
we conducted comparative statics using the steady-state solutions of the model over a 
range of scenarios.  To begin, we looked at the single-grower case in which one isolated 
grape grower maximizes profit subject to damage from sharpshooters, but experiences 
neither in- nor out-migration of the insects.  While this scenario is unlikely in the real 
world, it is not impossible given that some vineyards in Napa may be surrounded by land 
without BGSS host plants.  For example, this could be the case if a given grower was 
surrounded by neighbors that had all revegetated their riparian land.  We examined the 
                                                           
7 Further analysis could include studying the dynamic path of these solutions to determine whether that 
additional level of complexity could lend understanding to the issue.  However, in preliminary dynamic 
analysis, adding an allowance for adjustments over time had little effect.  
 15 
 
one-grower optimal outcomes over a range of several parameters: control cost, vine 
replacement cost, crush price, and vine maturity rate. 
As expected, as we increased the price of control, the optimal quantity of control 
fell, and to compensate, the number of vines replaced increased.  However, over the 
feasible range of control prices, no land was abandoned, because it was still relatively 
cheap to replace vines. With less and less control, the number of sharpshooters increased 
toward the carrying capacity of the block.  With more vines needing to be replaced, the 
shadow value of land fell. 
Changing the price of vine replacement had more dramatic effects on the results. 
As we increased the price of vine replacement, control increased to reduce the required 
number of vines being replaced.  Once vine replacement became too expensive, at 
roughly $150/vine (less with a higher discount rate), both control and vine replacement 
declined rapidly with additional increases in vine prices, the sharpshooter population 
increased, and the grower began to abandon land.  For a graphical representation of this 
case, see Figure 1. 
Comparative statics for the crush price of winegrapes are also of interest.  When 
we decreased the crush price below $1,200/ton, some land was left fallow, which is 
consistent with statements of some growers in interviews who reported that low crush 
prices in recent years had led them to abandon certain blocks (or parts of blocks).  The 
entire block (10 acres) was utilized when the crush price reached around $1,200/ton.
9 As 
the crush price increased, so did the shadow value of marginal land, which was zero until 
the crush price rose above $1,200/ton.  Additionally, as the crush price increased, more 
control was utilized and more vines were replaced, and as a result the number of 
                                                           
9 No land was planted when the crush price was set at zero.   16 
 
sharpshooters on the property fell.  When we decreased the crush price and the cost of 
vine replacement simultaneously, land abandonment occurred sooner than if either 
element were varied on its own. 
We also varied,μ, the parameter that measures vine maturation speed, in order to 
get a better idea of the importance of treating vines as capital stocks that take time to bear 
fruit, in contrast to annual crops.  While this is not a parameter that policymakers have 
control over, it can help us to understand the effects of treating grapevines as annuals 
rather than capital stocks that take several years to mature.  As the speed at which vines 
mature was increased, so too did the shadow value of land, the optimal sharpshooter 
population, the number of bearing vines, the amount of vines replaced, and the quantity 
of control. Varying μalone did not influence land abandonment, although slower-
maturing vines in combination with a low crush price or high vine replacement cost 
caused more land abandonment than would occur otherwise.  Thus, treating vines as an 
annual rather than a perennial crop can yield estimates of land value that are overinflated, 
and predict less use of control and more vine replacement at the optimum. Mature vines 
that take longer to replace are more valuable, and thus more worth protecting, ceteris 
paribus.
10 
The discount rate also played an important role in determining the values of 
parameters for which land was abandoned.  The default discount rate used here is 3 
percent per annum.  When we increased the discount rate it caused a substantial drop in 
the values of vine replacement cost and crush price for which land abandonment began, 
and the value of crush price for which land was abandoned increased.  At a 7 percent 
                                                           
10 Note that if vine maturation speed were to change, it is likely that other parameters, such as crush price, 
would also change, perhaps in dramatic ways. 17 
 
discount rate, land abandonment began when the vine replacement cost was $65/vine, 
roughly 55 percent less than the critical value of $145 using a 3 percent discount rate.  
Likewise, using a 7 percent discount rate, land abandonment began at a crush price of 
$1,800/ton, a 33 percent increase over the critical crush price of $1,350 that applied for a 
discount rate of 3 percent. 
 
Two (Noncooperative) Growers, Unilateral Control 
In this case, we examined the optimal actions of a single grower with one 
neighbor who does not control.  We allowed the neighbor’s insect population to vary and 
examined the changes in optimal actions of the grower in question in response to changes 
in the given insect populations on the neighbor’s land.  Additionally, while we fixed the 
sharpshooter carrying capacity on Grower 1’s land at 80, it is possible that a neighbor 
could have a higher carrying capacity, so we allowed Nj to reach 120 at its maximum.  
We (somewhat arbitrarily) assumed that 30 percent of the each grower’s population 
migrates into their neighbor’s vineyard.  
As we increased the number of insects on the neighbor’s property, control on 
Grower 1’s land became less effective, since it was negated in part by the influx of 
sharpshooters from neighboring land.  As a result, control fell as the number of insects on 
a neighbor’s property increased.  As control dropped off and more insects migrated in, 
the number of vines replaced increased.  Grower 1’s own population of insects increased 
toward carrying capacity, and the shadow value of Grower 1’s land fell.  However, 
Grower 1 did not abandon any land.   
  When we changed other parameters along with the neighboring sharpshooter 
population, the land abandonment results changed.  While large numbers of in-migrating 18 
 
insects alone did not cause a grower to abandon land, Figure 3 shows that, in combination 
with high vine replacement costs, large numbers of neighboring sharpshooters caused the 
grower to abandon land at lower vine replacement costs than otherwise (approximately 
$150/vine, depending on the influx of insects).   
 
Social Planner with Two Blocks 
Next we assumed that a social planner manages two vineyard blocks, to maximize their 
combined profit, with grapes grown on Block 1 fetching half the price of grapes grown 
on Block 2.  We allowed the sharpshooters to migrate between the two properties in the 
same fashion as in the unilateral control case; the difference here is that the planner 
determines the control strategy in both blocks, so neither population is taken as given.  
This is a frequent scenario in Napa, where individual growers often own and manage 
blocks in various locations across the county and beyond, so control over multiple blocks 
is common.  However, it is also common for different growers to own adjacent blocks of 
land, so it is interesting to examine this case in order to determine the possible gains from 
cooperation between these growers.   
As in the one-grower case, as we increased the price of control, both blocks 
utilized less of it and instead substituted more vine replacement.  Over the range of 
control costs we examined, the social planner always devoted more control to the high-
priced block (Block 2) than the low-priced block (Block 1) since the opportunity costs of 
foregone crop were higher in Block 2 than in Block 1.  As we increased control costs, the 
sharpshooter populations in both blocks increased, but the planner did not abandon land 
in either block.   19 
 
  As we increased the price of vine replacement, the planner increased control and 
decreased vine replacements. In Block 1, at $170/vine, the marginal shadow value of land 
fell to zero, and the social planner began to abandon land.  Up until this point, the 
increase in control on both blocks led to lower sharpshooter populations, with slightly 
fewer sharpshooters in Block 2 than Block 1.  After that point, however, control in Block 
1 fell and vine replacement dropped drastically.  Because control dropped off in Block 1, 
the sharpshooter population in that block increased.  While the planner did not abandon 
land in Block 2 at the same price point as in Block 1, Block 2 began to see increased in-
migration of insects because of the reduction in control in Block 1 and consequently any 
control used in Block 2 was less effective.  However, the planner did not abandon land in 
Block 2 over the relevant parameter space.  Note that the price per vine at which land 
began to be abandoned is $170, roughly 12 percent higher in the social planner case than 
in the two-grower, unilateral control case, supporting the hypothesis that cooperative 
control strategies could reduce abandonment.  Figure 4 shows control and sharpshooter 
population as functions of vine replacement cost for both blocks. 
We also experimented with the effects of changing the discount rate for the social 
planner case.  When we increased the discount rate from 3 to 7 percent per annum, the 
planner abandoned land in Block 1 at a lower cost of vine replacement, roughly $65/vine, 
or approximately a 40 percent decrease.  The planner also abandoned land in Block 2, 
although this did not occur until the vine replacement cost reached approximately 
$140/vine. 
  These comparative statics are helpful in showing which parameters have the most 
impact as well as in forming testable hypotheses.  For example, we expect land adjacent 20 
 
to sharpshooter habitat to be less valuable but land to be worth more if it is next to a 
neighbor who does a good job of controlling for sharpshooters.  Not surprisingly, we 
expect land to be more valuable if it is planted with vines that either mature faster or 
fetch a higher crush price.   
  We also expect high vine replacement cost and/or low crush price to lead growers 
to abandon land across a range of scenarios, and a high discount rate will exacerbate land 
abandonment in those cases.  Perhaps most notably, as long as vines can be replaced 
relatively cheaply, land abandonment is fairly insensitive to the cost of control as well as 
numbers of in-migrating insects.  These could be important pieces of information for 
policymakers looking to support grapegrowers during periods of high pressure from PD; 
those looking to provide relief to grapegrowers should look to mechanisms that reduce 
the price of vine replacement, or compel growers to cooperate regarding their control 
schemes.   
 
Conclusions 
  We constructed this model specifically to examine the Napa Valley/BGSS-
vectored PD issue.  In the southern parts of the state, however, the PD problem is quite 
different and potentially more threatening to the wine industry there.  One potentially 
valuable extension of our model might focus on the issue of PD as it affects the 
winegrape industry in southern California. Major concerns about PD grew after a 
devastating outbreak in the Temecula Valley (in southern California) in the late 1990s, 
spread by the newly-arrived, non-native Glassy-Winged Sharpshooter (GWSS), which 
has much greater capacity to spread PD than the BGSS because it can fly much longer 21 
 
distances (up to a half mile at a time) and can feed lower on the grape cane. The GWSS 
does not depend on riparian or irrigated plants but instead tends to overwinter in citrus 
groves, and has the ability to feed on a wide range of plants (Hill 2010).  The GWSS 
thrives in citrus orchards, which are widespread in southern California.  While PD 
problems caused by the GWSS in southern California are larger and more difficult to 
model in some ways, the spatial externality problem is similar and this could be a useful 
extension of the model described here.  
  In this paper, we have used spatially-explicit modeling techniques to gain a better 
understanding of how grapegrowers’ actions indirectly cause them to interact with each 
other through their sharpshooter populations.  We carefully take account of the biological 
characteristics of the insects as well as the perennial nature of the crop being examined, 
which both represent differences from other attempts to examine this disease in particular 
and other pest and disease problems in agriculture.  This work shows how these 
characteristics, in concert, can cause growers to abandon land that is affected by the 
disease, shedding light on a little understood issue in the Napa Valley.  Specifically, we 
used a weak inequality constraint to model the constraint on total available land, which 
allowed us to explore land abandonment.  While the introduction of this seemingly 
simple tweak to the classic optimal control model complicated the process of obtaining 
solutions, it also showed the importance of doing so in this case as it helps to show why 
land is being abandoned in the Napa Valley, an area that contains by far the most 
valuable vineyard land in the California (California Chapter of the American Society of 
Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers 2010).   22 
 
  The results of the numerical analyses can be used to guide policymakers in aiding 
grape growers in times of high PD pressure.  These results suggest that if heterogeneous 
growers can work together to coordinate BGSS control, they will be better off in that they 
will experience less damage from PD and will abandon less land.  In times of high PD 
pressure, policymakers could create pest control districts in which growers (and 
residential property owners alike) would be required to treat for BGSS, which could help 
curb losses. Additionally, by varying the vine maturation rate, we found that it is 
important to consider the perennial, capital stock nature of the grapevines.  When we 
allowed the vines in the model to mature immediately, as in the annual crop case, the vine 
replacement costs for which land was abandoned were much higher, as was the estimate 
of the shadow value of land.  Our numerical analysis also indicates that some parameters 
can be much more useful than others in determining the viability of a vineyard.  The price 
of vine replacement, in particular, stands out as an important parameter in determining 
whether vineyards are profitable.  Thus, subsidies on winegrape plantings would be much 
more efficient than subsidizing controls or other inputs in assisting grapegrowers in times 
of high-PD stress. 
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
Figure 1:  Images of Pierce’s Disease 
1a. Diseased Vine and example of land abandonment in the Napa Valley 
     
1b. Participatory Mapping Example 
 ii 
 
Figure 2: Selected comparative statics for vine replacement cost, one grower case 
 
 
Figure 3: Abandoned land as a function of vine replacement cost and neighbor’s 
sharpshooter population 
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Appendix B:  Model Parameterization 
  Table 1 summarizes the parameters that we used in the model.  The values 
assigned were chosen by reviewing the relevant literature as well as consulting experts.  
As a result, we have a reasonable amount of confidence in the estimates used, but in some 
cases they should be viewed as best guesses rather than statements of fact.  The numerical 
analysis was conducted using the TOMLAB package in MATLAB using both the knitro and 
snopt solvers. 
  The cost of control is measured by the parameter w
S, with the total control cost 
being quadratic in controls, 
S S 2 w 0.01w SS  .  In the base case, we used w
S = 6, which 
was chosen by speaking with grape growers during interviews about riparian revegetation 
as well as alternative control strategies.  The cost of vine replacement is structured 
similarly, with the total cost equal to 
2 I 0.01 I
II ww  . The base cost of $11/vine was taken 
from both interviews with farmers and the Cabernet Sauvignon Vine Loss Calculator for 
Napa (Klonsky and Livingston 2009).   
  For several of the biological parameters we utilized, exact measures were not 
available.  To estimate these parameters, we discussed them with Barry Hill, the CDFA 
entomologist and then conducted sensitivity analyses, many of which are described in the 
body of the paper.  These include the kill rate, β,and the damage parameter, d, which can 
be interpreted as the probability that any one insect will cause disease in a given vine.  At 
this time we have assumed for simplicity that the rate of damage to non-bearing and 
bearing stocks is the same, although the model is written so that these could be different 
rates.  The sharpshooters’ natural growth rate, R, and measure of carrying capacity, K, ii 
 
were determined in the same fashion.  Note that the carrying capacity is reached at






, so K 80 N . The dispersal matrix is based on the same 
methods.  We have assumed at this point that no one grower represents a sink (more 
insects enter than exit her property) or a source (more insects exit than enter her 
property); instead in our model the properties are fully integrated and insects migrate in 
both directions. 
  We utilized quantity and acreage (to calculate yields) and crush prices from 
(rounded) historical averages for Cabernet Sauvignon in the Napa Valley, using the 2009 
Crush and Acreage Reports (California Department of Agriculture/National Agricultural 
Statistics Service 2009), and the number of vines per acre was taken from (Klonsky and 
Livingston 2009).  The block acreage (A ) was in the range of block sizes that growers in 
Napa County reported.  The rate of vine maturity, μ, is based on vines that reach 
maturity at 5 years, which was typical for growers interviewed.  In order to avoid 
explicitly adding time-lags into an already continuously dynamic model, we assume that 
since vines can be replaced each year, 0.2 of all of these non-bearing (immature) vines 
become bearing (mature) each year.  The non-PD death rate is based on interviews with 
farmers.     







Table 1:  Base Level Parameter Values and Explanations 
Parameter    Explanation    Given value 
w
S    Unit cost of control ($/unit)    6 
w
I    Unit cost of investment ($/vine)    11 
d
NB    Damage per insect per vine for non-bearing vines    0.0001 
d
B    Damage per insect per vine for bearing vines    0.0001 
R    Natural growth rate of sharpshooter population    2 
K    Sharpshooter carrying capacity    80 
β    Proportion of insects killed per unit of control    0.001*R 
Y    Yield/vine (tons)    0.00382 
a    Acres/vine (acres)    1/1555 
A    Scale unit at which the problem is solved (acres)    10 
ρ    Annual discount rate    0.03 
μ    Annual rate of vine maturity from non-bearing to 
bearing 
  0.2 
η    Annual non-PD death rate     0.02 
p    Crush price in the one-grower model ($/ton)    4000 
p1    Crush price for Block 1 in two grower model ($/ton)    3500 
p2    Crush price for Block 2 in two grower model ($/ton)    7000 
ij      Dispersal between properties; symmetric.     0.3 
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